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 National Science
Foundation Award #0449946 |
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CAREER: Theoretical and Practical Mechanism Design With an Emphasis on Public School Choice |
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| Investigator(s): |
Atila Abdulkadiroglu (PI)
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| Sponsor: |
Columbia University, NY 10027 2128546851
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| Start Date/Expiration Date |
2005-06-01 to 2006-05-31 (amended 2005-07-06) |
| Awarded Amount to Date: |
$80,892 |
| Abstract: Is there a fair and efficient way of allocating public schools among pupils? Can parents manipulate public school admissions processes, and are school districts able to avoid these manipulation efforts? Can school districts maintain racial and ethnic balance at schools while providing parents with choice? The theory of mechanism design attempts to provide theoretical answers to such questions by studying the design of institutions through which individuals interact. Practical mechanism design or market design, a rising field in economics, on the other hand, goes a step further and designs and implements mechanisms for complicated real-life problems.
This project aims to contribute to these two fields through the study of problems of allocation of
student places in public schools. The project encompasses both theoretical and empirical areas of research. The first segment of this project, a collaboration with the New York City Department of Education, focuses upon the issue of controlled choice constraints in allocation and the appeal of outcomes resulting from those constraints. The problem of complementarity in this issue will be addressed through the development of a theory of fair allocation. The design of an appeals process will, importantly, yield a new class of problems involving hybrid models and consider the problem of design efficiency. Further, research on related distributive issues will add to the literature on atching.
The second major segment of this project, involving collaboration with the NYC DOE and Boston Public Schools, focusses upon the design and evaluation of systems that address many of the theoretical problems discovered and discussed prior. First, an evaluation exercise for the public schools admissions process in New York will meet an increasing need to report design efforts in economics literature. Second, a major multi-year study of the Boston schools admissions process will assess the incentives and efficiency of a system that has been in place for nearly two decades through simulation exercises. The design and results of this study will represent both an end-to-end
process, from mechanism design theory to its application, and will advance policy research and practice.
The successful completion of the project requires a highly interdisciplinary approach, both intellectual and social, with collaboration across disciplines of economics, operations research, computer science, and public policy. The participation of policy makers within the scope of this project introduces new questions and access to rich data sets otherwise unavailable to economists; access to such data encourages collaboration across fields within economics, among theoretical economists, labor economists and econometricians. The interdisciplinary approach of this project
therefore will yield the creation and maintenance of a network across disciplines and across fields.
The rising field of practical mechanism design provides immense opportunity for interdisciplinary education at the undergraduate and graduate levels and for the training of practitioners and public servants. One objective is to integrate this frontier research into the economics curriculum and PhD program, with courses open to economics and engineering students that provide new research opportunities and new solution strategies by introducing the economist.s approach to well-studied engineering problems. A website dedicated to the training of public servants in school districts will be developed; it will provide a forum for issues related to school choice, offer a database of school choice plans throughout the US, and offer free software that will aid practitioners in designing dmissions processes
Intellectual Merit: The expansion of knowledge on practical mechanism design would represent an important development and cross-fertilization within the discipline of economics. First, the practical mechanism design exercise introduces new theoretical problems and policy questions. The project will push the frontiers of the theory of mechanism design by studying these problems in a theoretical context. Second, the design and implementation of mechanisms in real-life markets requires a systematic study of institutional details; when these details expand beyond the boundaries of economists. analytical toolbox, it will systematically incorporate computational and
experimental economics. Third, the results and the lessons derived from the design exercises will be published in scientific journals, thereby fostering the creation of a design literature, whose focus will differ significantly from the theoretical literature. Fourth, a practical mechanism design approach offers an opportunity to revisit long-standing questions with new and rich data sets.
Broader Impact: This project has a direct public benefit: it will help school districts design better student assignment mechanisms. It will also enhance policy makers. understanding of factors that effect student achievement and parental preferences in school choice. The development of new theories and design of new models and processes has several other applications and extensions, including government or public-sector labor markets. |
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| NSF Org: |
SES - Division of Social and Economic Sciences |
| Award Number: |
0449946 |
| Award Instrument: |
Continuing grant |
| Program Manager: |
Julia I. Lane
SES Division of Social and Economic Sciences
SBE Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences
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| NSF Program(s): |
ECONOMICS |
| Field Application(s): |
Human Subjects |
| Program Reference Code(s): |
FACULTY EARLY CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, 1045
UNASSIGNED, 0000 |
| Program Element Code(s): |
1320 |
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