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National Science
Foundation Award #0455926 |
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Collaborative Research: The Impact of Legitimacy by Endorsement on Coalition Formation in Power Structures |
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| Investigator(s): |
Henry Walker (PI)
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| Sponsor: |
University of Arizona, AZ 85721 5206266000
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| Start Date/Expiration Date |
2005-09-01 to 2007-02-28 (amended 2005-09-01) |
| Awarded Amount to Date: |
$19,776 |
| Abstract: SES-0456064
David Willer
University of South Carolina
SES-0455926
Henry Walker
University of Arizona
This research integrates two major sociological theoretical research perspectives-Network Exchange Theory and Legitimacy Theory-to study the effects of legitimacy by endorsement on coalition formation in strong power structures. From Network Exchange Theory (NET), experiments have been completed to show that high-power central actors reap maximal benefits at exchange and low-power peripherals get minimal rewards. At issue for this research is whether low power actors will act to form coalitions and oppose the power exercised over them and, if so, with what effectiveness. Legitimacy Theory (LT) argues that group members are more likely to take actions that are collectively legitimized. When applied to exchange network processes, LT implies that low power actors are more likely to initiate coalition activity, to actually form coalitions, and to act effectively in them when coalition formation has been legitimized. The current experiments will study the effects of legitimacy by endorsement. In LT, endorsement refers to the approval or support that low power actors give to various elements of social situations including actors, positions or roles, behaviors and the rules that link actors, roles and behaviors. In this experimental study, subjects will complete a series of negotiations and exchanges in two-part. In Part 1, subjects negotiate exchanges independently. No one is given the opportunity to form a coalition. Joint application of NET and LT implies that subjects are most likely to initiate coalition formation and to actually form coalitions in the High Endorsement treatment and least likely to do so in the Low Endorsement condition with the control condition falling between. Coalitions are expected to be more stable (i.e., members are less likely to defect) and more effective in the High Endorsement condition and least stable and least effective in the Low Endorsement condition. A coalition's effectiveness is measured by the extent of its success in countervailing power. The two-structure design permits observation of size effects on coalition formation, stability and effectiveness, and permits tests of more than 20 additional theoretical predictions.
BROADER IMPACT
The theory of collective action offers a quite gloomy picture for the prospects of acting collectively. Nevertheless, collective actions do succeed and, when they do, often that theory is silent. Do they succeed at times because of the effects of legitimacy? This research will answer that question. The research will enhance sociology's infrastructure by adding its coalition designs to the Web-Lab housed at the University of South Carolina (weblab.moore.sc.edu). Like all Web-Lab designs, researchers at any location in the U.S. or elsewhere will be able to access these. The USC laboratory contributes to research-based learning, offering undergraduate and graduate classes using the Web-Lab. Designs used in this research will importantly enhance that course work. The USC laboratory also enhances diversity among student researchers. Currently, the majority of student researchers are women and, in a typical year, 20% of student researchers are African-American. |
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| NSF Org: |
SES - Division of Social and Economic Sciences |
| Award Number: |
0455926 |
| Award Instrument: |
Standard Grant |
| Program Manager: |
Patricia White
SES Division of Social and Economic Sciences
SBE Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences
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| NSF Program(s): |
SOCIOLOGY |
| Field Application(s): |
Human Subjects |
| Program Reference Code(s): |
UNASSIGNED, 0000 |
| Program Element Code(s): |
1331 |
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