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 National Science
Foundation Award #0516761 |
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Laboratory Studies of Transgression, Collective Resistance and social Interactions |
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| Investigator(s): |
Timothy Cason (PI)
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| Sponsor: |
Purdue University, IN 47907 7654944600
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| Start Date/Expiration Date |
2005-08-01 to 2006-07-31 (amended 2005-08-25) |
| Awarded Amount to Date: |
$78,906 |
| Abstract: This study uses experimental methods to study the conflict between a leader and a set of subordinates in a collective resistance game (CR game) that has been influential in the political economy literature and has important applications in organizational economics. This
game captures the idea that the leader's decision regarding whether to transgress against
subordinates' rights depends crucially on his expectation of whether subordinates will succeed in challenging his power when transgression takes place, and how a successful challenge requires the subordinates to solve a coordination problem.
The project first studies simple variants of this CR game to understand empirically how well subordinates can solve this coordination problem. It then embeds the CR game in different environments to understand how differences in social contexts-for example, the existence of particular communication opportunities, different types of repeated play, and prior interactions between the players which can potentially foster trust between them-can
affect the subordinates' abilities to solve their coordination problem and the incidence of
transgression. It also represents a serious attempt to develop controlled methods for increasing trust and social capital in the laboratory to better understand how these factors influence later social interactions.
Broader Impacts. The research has important implications for practical policy conclusions and prescriptions. Results should provide insights useful for understanding how political and social institutions can affect the incentive and ability of a political leader ("sovereign") to violate citizen rights and expropriate surplus from less powerful members of society. Another important application will be the deterrence of opportunistic behavior by the leader in organizational economics. The leader (such as a CEO) has the power to define the rules of the game that govern interactions within the firm, which leads to a "managerial dilemma" and interests of firm owners to prevent the organizational leader from violating rights of subordinates or otherwise altering the rules of the game to his advantage.
The study is also projected to have a broad impact for teaching, learning, participation by
underrepresented groups and for building partnerships. The project will employ over 800
undergraduate student subjects drawn from a large and diversified student population at Purdue University and will provide these students with important exposure to modern research methods. Many of these subjects, drawn from economics and management classes, will be non-science majors. Engaging undergraduate students in economics experiments will hopefully motivate their curiosity and it may even stimulate sufficient interest in some of them that they will choose to pursue a research career in the discipline. [It was the introduction to experiments in his undergraduate studies that inspired the principal investigator to make such a career choice.] The VSEEL laboratory at Purdue has an excellent record of involving members of underrepresented minority groups at both the undergraduate and graduate levels and this project is expected to continue this tradition. |
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| NSF Org: |
SES - Division of Social and Economic Sciences |
| Award Number: |
0516761 |
| Award Instrument: |
Continuing grant |
| Program Manager: |
Kaye Husbands Fealing
SES Division of Social and Economic Sciences
SBE Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences
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| NSF Program(s): |
DECISION RISK & MANAGEMENT SCI, ECONOMICS |
| Field Application(s): |
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| Program Reference Code(s): |
UNASSIGNED, 0000 |
| Program Element Code(s): |
1321
ECONOMICS, 1320 |
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