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 National Science
Foundation Award #0548285 |
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CAREER: Credible Commitments in International Relations |
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| Investigator(s): |
Michael Tomz (PI)
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| Sponsor: |
Stanford University, CA 94305 6507232300
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| Start Date/Expiration Date |
2006-02-01 to 2007-01-31 (amended 2006-01-25) |
| Awarded Amount to Date: |
$96,919 |
| Abstract: Intellectual Merit: Every day leaders make threats and promises to other countries. Without a world government that compels leaders to keep commitments, why and when should anyone take foreign leaders at their word? In this CAREER research the investigator presents an integrated program of research and education to explore this fundamental question. The research and teaching focuses on two potentially important markers of credibility. Did leaders go public by telling their own citizens about threats and promises they issued abroad? And did they go legal by embedding their commitments in treaties and other international agreements?
Although the theoretical literature about public and legal commitments has advanced quickly, empirical research has not kept pace. The fundamental problem, which researchers have acknowledged but not satisfactorily overcome, is endogeneity. In precisely the situations when publicity and legalization would make it costly to renege, rational leaders will either follow through or avoid committing in the first place. This leaves scholars little chance to observe and measure the penalties that are central to our theoretical models. Research has also been hampered by insufficient data about perceptions. Do key actors believe public and legal commitments are more expensive to break? To know for sure, we need systematic data about the perceived costs of backtracking on public and legal commitments.
The Principal Investigator addresses these problems through the first-ever experimental analysis of public and legal commitments in international relations. The proposal has three interrelated components. First, I will refine and test leading theories by embedding experiments in surveys of masses and elites. The experiments are designed to measure the actual and perceived costs of reneging on public and legal commitments, while at the same time avoiding the endogeneity that is endemic to observational studies. Overall, the project supplies empirical microfoundations for a broad class of models and open new avenues for theoretical and empirical research.
Second, the investigator develops a computer software package to facilitate survey experiments in research and teaching. Scholars need only supply the questions, set a few parameters that control the experiments, and include sound or video clips as desired. The software automatically varies the content, order, and number of questions to match the researcher's design, and then compile a multimedia survey for delivery over the Internet. This tool reduces the financial and human costs of running experiments. Moreover, its audio and visual features should improve respondent satisfaction and elicit more thoughtful responses than standard Internet surveys.
Finally, the project contains a strong educational component including a research-based curriculum for undergraduates at Stanford. As part of their coursework, students will formulate hypotheses about international military and economic affairs, test them with the survey software tool, and present their findings in oral and written form. Outside the classroom, the investigator conducts an international relations laboratory where undergraduates collaborate with me and each other on the research in this proposal. With the data we collect, students have opportunities to make their own discoveries and publish them as honors theses or academic articles. Each summer, the investigator invites motivated high school students especially members of underrepresented minority groups to intern in the lab and learn about political science. Finally, the project serves graduate students through a new course about experimental methods in international relations.
Broader Impacts: The project (1) actively involves undergraduate and high school students in scholarly research, (2) develops a survey tool that could be used by teachers and researchers in many academic disciplines and in the private sector, (3) provides practical criteria for judging whether foreign leaders are likely to carry out their threats and promises, and (4) offers insights to leaders who must decide whether to commit publicly and legally in world affairs. |
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| NSF Org: |
SES - Division of Social and Economic Sciences |
| Award Number: |
0548285 |
| Award Instrument: |
Continuing grant |
| Program Manager: |
Brian D. Humes
SES Division of Social and Economic Sciences
SBE Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences
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| NSF Program(s): |
POLITICAL SCIENCE |
| Field Application(s): |
Human Subjects |
| Program Reference Code(s): |
FACULTY EARLY CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, 1045
PECASE- eligible, 1187
UNASSIGNED, 0000 |
| Program Element Code(s): |
1371 |
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